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To determine what measles virus genotype(s) circulated 
in Uganda after strategic interventions aimed at controlling/
eliminating measles, we examined samples obtained during 
2006–2009 and found only genotype B3.1, which had not 
been previously detected. Kenya was the likely source, but 
other countries cannot be excluded. 
I
n October 2002, Uganda implemented a 5-year (2002–
2006) accelerated measles control strategy that began 
with a vigorous attempt to interrupt all chains of measles 
transmission by using a 5-day countrywide vaccination 
campaign. This brisk catch-up campaign was preceded by 
vaccine potency tests; meticulous planning to ensure po-
litical, religious, and tribal leaders’ support; spirited social 
mobilization; training of health care workers and volun-
teers; and adequate provision of vaccination and cold chain 
materials at all vaccination posts, some of which were im-
provised structures (e.g., tents, schools, or under trees) for 
easy access. Community education was particularly vital 
to dispel commonly held myths that vaccinating children 
against measles or taking children having measles to the 
hospital (i.e., using foreign medicine) increases the risk for 
death. About 13.5 million (≈0.5 million above target) chil-
dren ages 6–168 months were vaccinated, giving a national 
measles vaccine coverage rate of 104% (1). This was fol-
lowed by keep-up campaigns in 15 high-risk districts for 
children ages 6–23 months in February 2005 and in April 
2005 for all previously unvaccinated children ages 9–59 
months. Uganda was virtually measles free in 2003–2005, 
but outbreaks resurfaced in 2006. Subsequently, nation-
wide follow-up supplemental measles vaccination cam-
paigns were conducted for children ages 6–59 months dur-
ing August–November 2006 (1) and for children ages 9–47 
months in June 2009.
Virologic surveillance before initiating accelerated 
measles control activities enables genotypes to be cataloged 
in a country both before and after vaccination campaigns, 
which together with standard epidemiologic data can help 
detect imported viruses and evaluate control strategies (2). 
In Uganda, measles virus isolation began in 2000 (3). Our 
study sought to determine the measles virus genotype(s) 
circulating in Uganda after strategic interventions aimed at 
controlling/eliminating measles in the country were imple-
mented.
The Study
As part of routine measles case investigations, urine 
samples and throat swab specimens for virus isolation were 
collected along with serum samples (0–12 days after rash 
onset) from patients across Uganda during 2006 through 
2009. Infections were conﬁ  rmed serologically or by virus 
isolation (4,5). Of the serum samples tested, 1,053 (15%) 
of 6,999 were positive for measles immunoglobulin (Ig) 
M; most were collected during 2006 (Figure 1). Twenty-
two isolates (37%) were obtained from 59 samples from 
patients who had IgM against measles virus; 1 isolate was 
obtained from a patient who did not have IgM against mea-
sles virus; and another isolate was obtained from a patient 
who did not have serologic testing. Virus isolation was suc-
cessful only in specimens collected within 5 days of rash 
onset (Table). 
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Figure 1. Laboratory-conﬁ  rmed measles cases in Uganda, 2006–
2009. Data from the accelerated measles control period 2003–2005 
are included for comparison. The surge in measles cases during 
2006 was caused by a resumption of measles outbreaks after a 
3-year lag period, due to an accumulated number of susceptible 
persons (1).Measles Virus Transmission, Uganda
All isolates belonged to genotype B3.1 (Figure 2), 
which had not been previously detected in Uganda (3). 
Twelve (57%) of 21 sequences obtained were identical 
(Table) and also identical to isolates from the 2005 measles 
outbreak in Kenya (Figure 2). However, 9 (43%) of 21 
showed neither 100% similarity with the other 12 Ugan-
dan isolates (Table) nor with any other isolate available in 
GenBank.
Since the inception of Uganda’s 2002–2006 acceler-
ated measles control strategic plan, the number of measles 
cases in the country has declined dramatically (Figure 1). 
After the 2003 campaign, virtually no cases of measles oc-
curred in Uganda for 3 years, until the outbreaks in 2006 
(1). Our data show that 819 (78%) of 1,053 of the serologi-
cally conﬁ  rmed measles cases for the 4-year surveillance 
period occurred during the 2006 outbreaks (Figure 1), con-
ﬁ  rming that the strategic interventions quickly subdued the 
2006 transmission cycles. Moreover, the pattern of measles 
genotypes detected from 2000–2009 (2006–2009 reported 
in this study) suggests that transmission of the previously 
endemic genotype D10 in Uganda (3) has been interrupted 
and replaced by genotype B3.1. However, since molecular 
surveillance in Uganda only began 10 years ago (3), we 
cannot ascertain which genotypes were circulating in the 
country before 2000. By 2001, B3.1 was geographically 
restricted to the western and central African countries of 
Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Sudan (6,7); however, by 
the end of 2005, it had spread to Kenya, supposedly from 
Nigeria, where it caused a massive epidemic that was linked 
to subsequent infections in Europe and the Americas (8).
The fact that most isolates from Uganda were identical 
to those previously identiﬁ  ed in neighboring Kenya indi-
cates that Kenya was the most likely immediate source of 
the B3.1 viruses presently circulating in Uganda. However, 
the contribution of other African countries cannot be ex-
cluded, because molecular surveillance is still largely lack-
ing in Africa (5). 
Only 14 (23%) of 61 patients with laboratory-con-
ﬁ  rmed measles (whose specimens were screened for mea-
sles virus isolates) had been vaccinated, demonstrating 
a gap in vaccination coverage and possible vaccination 
failure in some cases and the need for timely catch-up 
vaccination campaigns even in the low-risk districts. In 
Uganda, routine childhood vaccination against measles 
began in 1983, but vaccine coverage was initially too low 
to interrupt indigenous transmission. The situation was not 
helped by the rampant poverty, limited health-care infra-
structure, internal and external conﬂ  icts that have rocked 
the Great Lakes Region during the past 3 decades, high 
vaccination drop-out rates, and a high birth rate (second 
highest in the world, after Niger [9]). These conditions 
are typical in countries where vaccine-preventable infec-
tions remain a major problem (10). Nevertheless, educa-
tion of Ugandan health workers, politicians, and develop-
ment partners has been ongoing. This strategy has aroused 
strong interest and support for disease surveillance and 
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Table. Epidemiologic data associated with measles virus isolates analyzed, Uganda, 2006ԟ2009* 
Isolate name  District 
Patient
age, mo
Measles
vaccine
doses
Vaccination
card seen 
Date of 
onset
Interval,
d†
Measles
IgM
GenBank
accession
no. Identity‡
MVi/Bushenyi.UGA/43.06 Bushenyi  19 1 No 2006  Oct 4 Pos GU952229  A
MVi/Hoima.UGA/7.09/1 Hoima 36 X No 2009  Feb  5 Pos GU952246  B
MVi/Hoima.UGA/7.09/2 Hoima 36 X No 2009  Feb  2 Neg  B
MVi/Kampala.UGA/26.06/1 Kampala 30 X No 2006  Jun  1 Pos GU952239  A
MVi/Kampala.UGA/26.06/2 Kampala 36 X No 2006  Jun  4 Pos A
MVi/Kampala.UGA/26.06/3 Kampala 18 0 No 2006  Jun  2 ND  GU952237  C
MVi/Kasese.UGA/7.07/1 Kasese 25 0 Yes  2007  Feb  2 Pos GU952245  A
MVi/Kasese.UGA/7.07/2 Kasese 240 X No 2007  Feb  3 Pos A
MVi/Kitgum.UGA/28.06 Kitgum 60 2 No 2006  Jul  3 Pos GU952235  A
MVi/Mukono.UGA/26.06 Mukono 96 0 No 2006  Jun  1 Pos GU952238  D
MVi/Mukono.UGA/29.06 Mukono 276 X No 2006  Jul  3 Pos GU952233  E
MVi/Mukono.UGA/47.06 Mukono 48 1 Yes  2006  Nov 1 Pos GU952243  F
MVi/Wakiso.UGA/26.06 Wakiso  36 2 No 2006  Jun  1 Pos GU952240  A
MVi/Wakiso.UGA/27.06 Wakiso  96 0 No 2006  Jul  1 Pos GU952236  C
MVi/Wakiso.UGA/29.06 Wakiso  33 0 Yes 2006  Jul 1 Pos GU952234 A
MVi/Wakiso.UGA/31.06/1 Wakiso  19 1 No 2006  Jul 1 Pos GU952232  G
MVi/Wakiso.UGA/31.06/2 Wakiso  25 0 No 2006  Aug 2  Pos GU952231 A
MVi/Wakiso.UGA/32.06 Wakiso  11 X No 2006  Aug 1  Pos GU952230  A
MVi/Wakiso.UGA/41.06 Wakiso  27 0 No 2006  Oct  1 Pos GU952241  A
MVi/Wakiso.UGA/45.06 Wakiso  120 2 No 2006  Nov 2  Pos GU952242  H
MVi/Wakiso.UGA/49.06 Wakiso  216 1 No 2006  Dec 2  Pos GU952244  A
*All were genotype B3.1. IgM, immunoglobulin M; pos, positive; neg, negative; X, unknown; ND, not done. 
†Time between rash onset and sample collection. 
‡Nucleotide sequences sharing the same letter are identical. control activities from the political leadership, resulting in 
the creation of a special budget line for surveillance (11). 
Since 2003, routine vaccination has been strengthened 
by extending primary health care grants to all districts, 
and the implementation of the “Reaching Every District” 
strategy (12), among other interventions. Consequently, 
Uganda has recorded a tremendous rise in vaccination 
coverage, from 64% in 1997 to >85% by 2007 (1). This 
aggressive vaccination effort has been instrumental in in-
terrupting indigenous measles strain transmission in the 
country. 
All virus isolates from Uganda during 2000–2002, 
before accelerated measles control, belonged to genotype 
D10 (3). At that time, viruses isolated in countries border-
ing Uganda, such as Kenya, Sudan, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, belonged to genotypes D4, B3, and 
B2 (13). However, without enhanced regional surveillance, 
should genotype D10 be isolated again, it would be difﬁ  cult 
to determine whether it had truly been interrupted, without 
knowing if D10 was presently circulating in other African 
countries, which could serve as bases from which to rein-
troduce it into Uganda.
Conclusions
Our results show that, even under difﬁ  cult circum-
stances (e.g., poverty), optimal resource allocation and mo-
bilization of political will can interrupt vaccine-preventable 
diseases in Africa. These data provide molecular evidence 
that Uganda’s 2002–2006 vaccination strategy was suc-
cessful in interrupting indigenous measles transmission, but 
immunity gaps in the population allowed the establishment 
of an imported virus that was previously conﬁ  ned to west-
ern and central Africa. If national immunization programs 
across the region synchronized their vaccination strategies 
to eliminate sources of reintroduction, measles could be 
quickly eliminated from the entire continent. Vaccination 
success stories have already been noted in several African 
countries with routine coverage >80% (14,15). Therefore, 
continued education and cooperation are needed between 
countries, national policy makers, health care workers, and 
local communities throughout the continent to win the ﬁ  ght 
against measles.
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Figure 2. Phylogenetic analysis of the relationship between 
sequences of 21 Ugandan measles virus isolates obtained 
during 2006–2009 and 22 other recently described clade B 
nucleoprotein (N) gene sequences, including the World Health 
Organization reference strains for the B clade (13).  Boldface 
indicates different genotypes. Analyses are based on sequences 
of the 450 nt encoding the COOH-terminal 150 nt of the N gene. 
The unrooted neighbor-joining consensus tree was generated by 
bootstrap analysis of 500 replicates by using MEGA4 software 
(www.megasoftware.net). Bootstrap percentages are shown when 
>75%. Only names of the isolates from Uganda (UGA) start with 
“MVi,” and all comparison strains have their GenBank accession 
numbers indicated in parentheses. Genotypes of the World Health 
Organization reference sequences are indicated after the accession 
number. Comparison sequences were from viruses isolated in 
Benin (BEN), Cameroon (CAE), Côte d’Ivoire (CIV), Gabon (GAB), 
the Gambia, Germany (DEU), Great Britain (GBR), Kenya (KEN), 
Niger (NIG), Nigeria (NIE/NGA), Spain (ESP), Sudan (SUD), the 
Netherlands (NLD), and the United States (USA). Sequences 
from Uganda were most closely related to the B3.1 viruses of the 
September–December 2005 measles outbreak in Kenya (8). Scale 
bar indicates nucleotide substitutions per site.Measles Virus Transmission, Uganda
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